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Summary 
ISIS is not a state. Legal considerations point at that ISIS is a non-state actor 
and a terrorist organisation. Out of the declaratory theory of recognition, 
effective control, rule through consent, stabilisation of national conditions 
and the constitutive theory of recognition ISIS quite convincingly fulfils the 
first two criteria. In UNC article 2.4 we find a prohibition on the use of 
force. The use of force in Iraq and Syria to combat ISIS is predominantly 
justified by foreign actors through the pillars of self-defence (UNC article 
51), humanitarian intervention, consent of the host states and the need to 
protect own nationals. In this context, attribution of ISIS’ actions to the state 
of Iraq and Syria becomes relevant, to which we answer negatively. The use 
of collective self-defence could serve as a solution. Leniency towards the 
accumulation of events theory is more understandable than the anticipatory 
use of force. Necessity and proportionality are two important elements of 
self-defence, of which at least the prior can to a larger degree be established 
in our case. The consent of the Iraqi and Syrian government plays an 
important role in the legality of the use of force against ISIS. Conclusively, 
some questions regarding the practical difficulties of an eventual lawful use 
of force against ISIS arise such as previous downfalls of external actors in 
the Middle East and resentment among the masses. Diplomacy and methods 
specifically targeted at confining the territorial strengths are suggested as 
careful solutions to the problem.      
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Sammanfattning 
ISIS är inte en stat. Juridiska överväganden pekar på att ISIS är en icke-
statlig aktör och en terrorist organisation. Utav ‘the declaratory theory of 
recognition’, faktisk kontroll, styre genom samtycke, stabilisering av 
nationella förhållanden och ‘the constitutive theory of recognition’ uppfyller 
ISIS ganska övertygande de två förstnämnda kriterierna. I FN-stadgans 
artikel 2.4 finner vi våldsförbudet. Våld i Irak och Syrien i syfte att 
motverka ISIS förklaras framförallt av utländska aktörer genom argument 
som rör självförsvar (FN-stadgan artikel 51), humanitär intervention, 
samtycke av värdländerna och behovet av att skydda egna medborgare. I 
sammanhanget, blir hänförbarheten av ISIS åtaganden till staten relevanta, 
men vi svarar i nekande i kontexten. Kollektivt självförsvar skulle kunna 
vara en lämplig lösning. Det finns anledning att luta mot ‘the accumulation 
of events theory’ mer än ‘the anticipatory use of force’. Faktiskt behov och 
proportionalitet är två viktiga faktorer av självförsvar, av vilka den 
förstnämnda är till stor utsträckning fastlagd i vårt fall. Samtycke från den 
Irakiska och Syriska regeringen spelar en viktig roll vid lagenligt bruk av 
våldsparagrafen gentemot ISIS. Sammanfattningsvis, förekommer vissa 
frågor gällande de praktiska svårigheterna med eventuell lagenlig 
våldsanvändning mot ISIS t.ex. tidigare motgångar av externa aktörer i 
mellanöstern och misstro bland folket. Diplomati och metoder som är 
riktade just åt begräsning av ISIS territoriella styrkor föreslås som försiktiga 
lösningar till problemet.     
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, hereinafter ISIS, is attracting 
attention from the international community like never before. They have 
carried out operations in the name of this organisation as well as closely 
affiliated names for roughly a decade now, primarily from Iraq and Syria. In 
the backdrop of activities conducted by ISIS, the international community 
has shaped their legal policies accordingly. The U.S., for one, is carrying out 
airstrikes in Iraq and Syria and supplying and training the local forces with 
material to combat ISIS. The recurring causes for contemporary intervention 
in Iraq and Syria found in legal texts is that of self-defence and 
humanitarian intervention. The U.S. itself refers to intervention as part of a 
counterterrorism strategy1, but we have reason to take account of all legal 
justifications for the intervention. This essay is a study of legal intervention 
and ISIS.  
 
1.2 Aim of the study 
Since the emergence of ISIS, the events in Iraq and Syria have been viewed 
through many different lenses and this essay in particular aims to shed some 
legal light on the question of ISIS and the use of force against it. It seems 
that the grounding principle of sovereignty does not suffice to answer the set 
of questions that arise in connection with this new phenomena. It is essential 
that we identify the key factors involved and define them. It is only then that 
we have a reasonable chance of not only debating on lines of reason, but 
                                                
1 Barack Obama, ‘On ISIL, Our Objective is Clear’ (Washington, D.C., 10 September 
2014) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-
1> accessed 20 March 2015 
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also tackling the situation in Iraq and Syria and their international 
counterparts.   
1.3 Research questions and delimitations  
The main research question of this essay is derived from the title of the 
essay itself, namely the Legal Position of the Islamic State in International 
Law - Legality of the Use of Force against the Islamic State. In drawing 
conclusions on the topic a number of subtopics will be addressed, such as 
the question of statehood and the hierarchy between the criteria involved. 
Another underlying research question deals with the onset of rights entitled 
to a state in accordance with UNC articles 2.4 and 51 by a non-state actor.  
 
For a concrete analysis I will unfortunately have to leave out some very 
interesting aspects of intervention such as the mandate of the Security 
Council as per UNC article 42 and even the financing of ISIS. The actual 
use of force will take primacy over the threat of force in this essay.  
 
1.4 Materials and previous research  
During the course of research for this essay I found a large amount of 
literature about legality of the use of force, and less literature about ISIS. To 
illustrate, Christine Gray’s International Law and the Use of Force2 has 
served as an ideal introduction to the topic, but to compensate for the 
understandable absence of direct discussion on ISIS, I had much use of 
online legal journals. I even attempted to find common denominators 
between the chosen field of study and an advisory opinion from the ICJ, 
judgements from the ICJ and international documents to complete the 
investigation.  
 
                                                
2 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, OUP 2008)  
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1.5 Research method, theory and outline  
For achieving the purposes of this essay it will firstly be examined what 
legal position can be attributed to the Islamic State. We must classify ISIS 
because the rights and obligations that materialize depend the type of entity 
that we are dealing with. ISIS will be measured against the criteria of 
statehood and that of terrorism.  
 
The analysis will continue with a presentation of the most relevant articles 
from the Charter of the United Nations, mainly the prohibition on the use of 
force and the right to self-defence. The immediate link between the question 
of ISIS, statehood and the UNC articles will be found in chapter 3, with a 
presentation of a flexible and a strict approach as well as considerations of 
attribution. Relevant international case law on the matter will be presented.  
 
Associated legal norms will follow. The selection of the norms to be taken 
up was based on their recurring prevalence in the legal texts that I studied. 
These include the accumulation of events theory, the theory of anticipatory 
use of force, necessity and proportionality. Consent and humanitarian 
intervention will also be examined.  
 
With this knowledge at our disposal, the final segment will once again bring 
into focus intervention in the specific case of ISIS and its legal implications.  
 
In this investigation UNC articles 2.4 and 51 among others will be examined 
closely and it can already be mentioned that parallel to the conclusions that I 
draw, one ought to have VCLT articles 31-33 in mind for a thorough 
understanding of the relationship between the conflicting norms and texts to 
be discussed.  
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2 The legal categorization of 
the Islamic State 
2.1 The concept of a state and the Islamic 
State 
Currently ISIS is estimated to comprise of 25 000 – 30 000 persons. 
Contrary to the proclamations of the Islamic State about being a State and 
an Islamic Caliphate, many functionaries of international law do not 
recognise ISIS as a state. This is partly owed to the criteria on the definition 
of a state in article 1 of the Montevideo Convention. It should not go 
unnoticed that one could, judged from factual information, to some extent 
successfully argue that ISIS does in fact possess a permanent population 
(those who are under occupancy of ISIS in Iraq and Syria), a defined 
territory (occupied areas by ISIS in Iraq and Syria), a government (the 
proclaimed caliphate) and even an ability to enter into relations with other 
states. For a thorough analysis we must delve into questions of ‘effective 
control’3, consent, durability of conditions and the ‘declaratory’ and 
‘constitutive’4 theory of recognition.  
 
2.1.1 Effective control and consent 
As concerns the governance criteria, a test based on ‘effective control’5 
narrows down the possibility of an eventual existence of a state. Most 
researchers would agree that ISIS is in fact exercising effective control over 
its occupied regions. Franck and Crawford are known for associating the 
governance yardstick with notions of consent-of-the-people and the consent 
                                                
3 Sean Murphy, ‘Democratic legitimacy and the recognition of states and governments’ 
(1999) 48 ICLQ 547 
4 ibid 548 
5 ibid 547 
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of-the-previously-reigning government, respectively.6 Murphy enriches the 
two theories by accruing to them the status of an ‘international legal norm’7.  
 
Interestingly, the case of the Algerian government quelling the Islamic 
Salvation Front in 1991 disproved the consent-of-the-people theory in that, 
in spite of the forceful elimination of political opposition by the Algerian 
government, the international community showed appreciation for the 
government’s actions. Indeed, this meant that the true consent of the people 
was never able to come to the forefront.  
 
In the case of ISIS, there really seems to be divided opinions on whether 
either of the two forms of consent exists in Iraq and Syria, though PEW’s 
reports, at least as concerns the consent-of-the-people dynamic, shows that 
support for ISIS in these countries is growing dimmer.8    
 
2.1.2 Stabilisation of conditions and the 
declaratory and constitutive theory of 
recognition  
Whether or not the recognition of a state necessitates the stabilisation of the 
Montevideo qualifications is another aspect.9 ISIS’ formation dates back to 
a number of years now, but it is still relatively early to assess whether this 
criteria has been met. For that matter, the extent to which it is the number of 
years that determines if an entity successfully qualifies as a state or not is 
unclear. Rather it is territorial control, provision of services and an overall 
togetherness of the people, which is the true indicator of stabilisation 
according to Dodge and Wasser.10 Nonetheless, the declaratory theory of 
recognition and constitutive theory of recognition11 could act as a reserve 
                                                
6 Thomas Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 86 AJIL 46 and 
James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 33   
7 Murphy (n 3) 574 
8 Audrey Cronin, ‘ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group’ (2015) 94 Foreign Affairs  
9 Murphy (n 3) 547 
10 Becca Wasser and Toby Dodge, ‘The Crisis of the Iraqi State’ (2014) 54 Taylor and 
Francis Online 14 
11 Murphy (n 3) 548 
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anchor, of which ISIS seems to satisfy the first as they have declared 
themselves a state, but have not won widespread international approval for 
the same. In any case, though according to traditional international law, it is 
unequivocal that ISIS is not a state, Cronin prefers to call ISIS a ‘pseudo-
state led by a conventional army’12. Perhaps Coll’s interpretation of ISIS is 
even closer to reality:  
 
‘ISIS is […] part terrorist […] part guerrilla 
army, part proto-state’13.    
 
It would be in place to reassert that ISIS still is not a state when viewed 
through the lens of international law.  
2.2 The Islamic State as a non-state actor  
Another term that is used to describe ISIS, especially in the terminology of 
the UNC is that of a non-state actor. At first sight, this means that the rights 
and responsibilities that stem from statehood cannot be instituted upon ISIS. 
A not so far consequence of this could be said to be that the activities of 
ISIS cannot be attributed either to the Iraqi or Syrian state. The legal 
implications of these sorts of conclusions are significant with regard to the 
use of force, which are best discussed under the rubric of attribution, further 
on in this essay.  
 
2.3 The Islamic State as a terrorist 
organisation  
ISIS is widely referred to as a terrorist organisation. Cronin, however, 
expresses that ISIS is too big and established to be contained within the 
                                                
12 Cronin (n 8)  
13 Steve Coll, ‘In Search of a New Strategy’ (2014) 90 New Yorker 27 
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scope of this description, and hence is not a terrorist organisation at all.14 
What the term terrorism more precisely means is therefore clearly not 
undisputed. On a subjective level, Rehman illustrates the difficulty in 
defining terrorism by presenting the well-known saying:  
 
‘One man’s terrorist is another man’s 
freedom fighter.’15 
 
2.3.1 Terrorism and the Rome Statute  
Terrorism is not included as a crime in the Rome Statute, so this does not 
tell us what terrorism is, rather it tells us what terrorism is not. 
Synchronically, the actions of ISIS can be regarded as being crimes against 
humanity, which render the activities of ISIS criminal. This has been voiced 
to be enough to legitimise military intervention.16  
 
2.3.2 Conventions, Resolutions, Reports and 
Terrorism 
We find more concrete guidance in article 1.2 of the OIC CCT, judging 
from which the objective practice of threats, destruction, harm and 
confiscation of rights, by ISIS amounts to terrorism. A similar line of 
argument is prevalent in S/RES 1368 and 1373 of 2001 and reports adopted 
by the Secretary General and Committees. In view of the last mentioned 
resolution and the ever-growing fear of terrorism, it was even questioned 
whether the resolution gave the go-ahead to an ‘unlimited’ use of force.17  
 
 
 
                                                
14 Cronin (n 8) 
15 Javaid Rehman, Islamic State Practices, International Law and the Threat from 
Terrorism (1st edn, Hart 2005) 73  
16 – –‘Muddled?’ (2014) 141 Commonweal 5  
17 Michael Byers, ‘Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law after 11 September’ 
(2002) 51 ICLQ 402  
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3 Introduction to self-defence 
as an exception to the use of 
force  
 
3.1 Introduction to articles 2.4 and 51 of 
the Charter of the United Nations 
It is intended that no derogation occur from the prohibition of threat or use 
of force in UNC article 2.4. This renders it a jus cogens character. 
Linderfalk, among others, does not accrue to this viewpoint, though he does 
admit that it is part of international customary law.18 In the article, the State 
is explicitly mentioned as the counterpart who shall enjoy this nearly 
absolute territorial and political independence. Self-defence was previously 
a feature of the Briand-Kellogg Pact (1928), and is currently regulated in 
UNC article 51. Apart from being a part of codified law, Byers believes that 
it is an acknowledged reason for the resort to force in customary 
international law.19 
 
3.1.1 Emergence of non-state actors 
The emergence of new non-state actors such as ISIS, who by some, are 
considered capable of carrying out the sort of armed attack mentioned in 
UNC article 51, raises the question of whether non-state actors by 
themselves and alone can cause the activation of the rights in UNC article 
2.4 and 51. This question is important because it allows us to gauge if 
intervention by victim states to combat non-state actors in a not guilty host 
state at the expense of UNC article 2.4 concords with international law. The 
                                                
18 Ulf Linderfalk, ‘The effect of jus cogens norms: whoever opened Pandora's box, did you 
ever think about the consequences?’ (2007) 18 EJIL 860 
19 Byers (n 17) 401 
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host state’s right to continue to be protected by the provisions of UNC 
article 2.4 vis-à-vis the victim state’s rights are at stake here.  
 
On this point, Simma, Khan, Nolte and Paulus present on the one hand that 
private groups are not the debtor nor the creditors of UNC article 2.4, 
whereas on the other hand they confer the rights and obligations of UNC 
article 2.4 to all ‘regimes exercising their authority in a stabilized manner’.20 
Since ISIS can, depending on the angle of argument, be placed under any 
one or both of the descriptions, an investigator may feel somewhat 
bewildered. We continue to wonder; then what are the true implications of a 
victim state or for that matter a third party using force against ISIS? 
 
3.2 State-to-state interaction – a 
restrictive view on the use of force 
against ISIS? 
In the Wall case, ICJ reiterated that it is an armed attack of one state, which 
legitimizes the victim state’s right to self-defence. However, even though 
this comment exhibits divisiveness of the state-to-state interaction, it was 
likewise implied that a non-state actor was responsible for the attacks.21 
Three dissenting judges went the whole way and took the stance that non-
state actors could indeed commit an armed attack. Moreover, even the 
separate opinion of one judge in the Congo case bears evidence of this.22  
 
Further, Trapp is convinced that when a victim state responds to the 
incitement of a non-state actor within the borders of another state, then this 
 
                                                
20 Simma et al, The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary (3rd edn, vol I, OUP 
2012) 213 
21 Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall (2004) para 139 
22 Congo v Uganda (Separate Opinion of Judge Simma) (2005) ICJ para 11 
 14 
‘surely amounts to a violation of that State’s 
territorial integrity, even if the use of force is 
defensive and not targeted at the State’s 
apparatus.’23  
 
The result of application of this theory on ISIS rules out the use of force in 
Iraq and Syria as adhering to international law, as ISIS according to 
traditional legal theory is not a state.  
3.3 State-to-non-state interaction – a 
flexible view on the use of force 
against ISIS? 
In the case of the attacks on the World Trade Centre on 11th September 2001 
by Al-Qaida, which gave leeway to changing international customary law, 
the host state’s right to sovereignty and independence had to take the 
backseat while the victim state was allowed to seek restoration. Corton sees 
the reasonableness of this solution.24 Raphael joins in and believes that 
attacks by non-state actors can indeed prompt self-defence as non-state 
actors can carry out armed attacks.25 Even though Raphael’s argument is 
slightly shaky when measured against contemporary international 
perceptions and more specifically the UNC, there is reason to give it 
attention. After all, many advocate that the use of force in international law 
is decentralized and a lot of solutions are contained in treaties and other 
forms of international relations between states.  
 
Naturally then, if ISIS, who in spite of being a non-state actor is the cause of 
the attack in UNC article 51, then the use of force against it could, as a 
starting point, be considered lawful.   
                                                
23 Kimberley Trapp, ‘Back to basics: necessity, proportionality, and the right of self-
defence against non-state terrorist actors’ (2007) 56 ICLQ 145 
24 Raphael Steenberghe, ‘The law against war or jus contra bellum: a new terminology for a 
conservative view on the use of force?’ (2011) 24 LJIL 763 
25 ibid 
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3.4 Attribution and the activities of ISIS   
Hirschmann asserts that there is ‘terrorism supported by a state’ as opposed 
to ‘terrorism tolerated by a state’ and this will be the basis of the discussion 
below.26 The idea of attribution aids in assessing when the actions of a non-
state actor can be attributed to a state. At first glance any conclusion reached 
from this course would seem to simplify the problem at hand, as this gives 
the victim state a legitimate reason for confining the territorial integrity and 
political independence of a host state. For example if the state of Iraq and 
Syria were legally responsible for the undertakings of ISIS, then the 
otherwise existing fact that the victim state would perhaps have to take the 
toll for not being able to intervene in Iraq and Syria as ISIS is a non-state 
actor, fades. As the reader will see, the situation is in fact far more complex 
and these dilemmas will be discussed further on in the essay.  
 
It can be added that the standpoints of ‘Bright-Liners’, who have a more 
black and white and strict approach to use of force in general, and 
‘Balancers’, who have a more flexible approach to the use of force, are two 
schools of popular thought.27 These could be used to argue for the different 
nuances of possible attribution of ISIS to the Iraqi and Syrian state, which 
will be taken up in the analysis below.  
  
3.4.1 Green light for attribution 
 
When states ‘actively support or willingly harbour’ the perpetrators, the 
question of attribution is considerably simplified and it has even been put 
forth that in cases like these military intervention is in place.28 Some authors 
                                                
26 Noelle Quenivet, ‘The World after Sept 11: has it really changed?’ (2005) 16 EJIL 565 
27 Matthew Waxman, ‘Regulating resort to force: form and substance of the UN Charter 
regime’ (2013) 24 EJIL 152 
28 Byers (n 17) 409  
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like to call this ‘response to indirect aggression’.29 What characterizes this 
concept is one state’s resort to armed force via the actions of another State 
or non-state actor of which the latter categories appear to be the main 
performers.30  
 
In the Congo case, the ICJ was of the opinion that rebel groups were acting 
against Congo on behalf of the Ugandan state and thus the attributably 
criteria was met.31 However, support which one state gives to another state 
or non-state actor does not necessarily need to amount to use of force, as 
was seen in the Nicaragua case.32 It is unclear if American armament and 
training of Iraqi and Syrian ground troops amounts to the use of force. 
Indeed this is not the same genre of attribution that we have been discussing 
so far, but the question nevertheless portrays the many interests involved in 
the current situation.   
 
There is not enough legal or political knowledge to suggest that the Iraqi or 
Syrian state is the sole initiator of the actions of ISIS and hence it can be 
summed up that ISIS actions are not attributable to the state.  
 
3.4.2 Yellow light for attribution  
 
One prominent indicator for attribution is that of ‘acquiescence’33, which 
results when a state tacitly consents to terrorist incentives within its borders. 
The line of argument can certainly be followed here as even consent by 
silence points to the involvement of the host state in the intentions of the 
terrorists and deserves a fair share of responsibility. In recent practice the 
applicability of the actor criterion in UNC article 2.4 has been viewed under 
‘more lenient conditions’.34  
                                                
29 Steenberghe (n 24) 775 
30 Simma et al (n 20) 211 and FRD §§ 8-9  
31 Congo v Uganda (2005) ICJ paras 160-165 and ARSIWA arts 4-8 
32 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (1986) ICJ para 191  
33 Trapp (n 23) 154  
34 Christian Tams, ‘The Use of Force Against Terrorists’ (2009) 20 EJIL 361  
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Current legal and political knowledge does not hint at that the Iraqi or 
Syrian state would be accepting of ISIS’ actions. This means that victim 
states acting in Iraq and Syria would need to seek refuge elsewhere for the 
legality of the use of force, especially in the case of total rejection of the 
idea of ISIS being able to trigger a victim’s states invocation of UNC article 
51. 
 
3.4.3 Red light for attribution  
 
It has been suggested that the terrorist organisation must be the sole target of 
the victim state if they were the only attacker.35 If the host state is 
practically unable bring the attacks of the terrorists to an end is one more 
reason to direct the victim state’s response at only the terrorists.36 However, 
the mandate of the U.S. in Iraq and Syria has been suspected of being too 
broad and not having ISIS as its focus.  
 
These ideas in particular have even welcomed the debate of ‘failed states’37. 
For example, if a state at one point in time did in fact meet the criteria of 
article 1 in the Montevideo Convention, but due to new circumstances does 
not continue to do so, then how do we view this state in the meaning of 
UNC article 2.4? Does intervention become more or less justified?  
 
3.5 Collective vs individual self-defence  
In relation to ISIS, several sources point to that the regional community in 
the Middle East, Iraqi army, Kurdish Peshmerga and Sunni forces could 
                                                
35 Trapp (n 23) 147 
36 ibid 156 
37 Byers (n 17) 403 and Simma et al (n 20) 217  
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cooperate together with the U.S. to defeat ISIS.38 Such action could in 
international law be termed collective self-defence. Upon consideration, we 
might actually find that the upside of this is that the U.S. would save itself 
from the on-going criticism for going overboard with its mandate of 2001 to 
defeat Al-Qaeda and of 2002 to go into Iraq. ISIS is a separate and arguably 
a conflicting entity to Al-Qaida and U.S. airstrikes in Syria are clearly not 
on Iraqi territory. One often-expressed problem with collective self-defence 
of this sort is that countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have made 
headlines for financing terrorism. To settle political aspirations of this kind 
would take time, but may certainly be worthwhile.  
 
                                                
38 Michael Pregent and Robin Simcox, ‘ISIS on the Run’ (2015) 94 Foreign Affairs and 
Leonard Weinberg, ‘The Islamic State and American National Security’ (2014) 10 
Democracy and Security 341 
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4 Self-defence and associated 
legal norms 
Once again, we keep to UNC articles 2.4 and 51 and analyse what impact 
developing legal norms has had on them. ISIS is even here the persistent 
topic of debate.  
 
4.1 Accumulation of events  
When two or more attacks allow for a victim state to legally resort to force 
we can say that the accumulation of events doctrine has penetrated. Over 
time, states have become more accepting of this theory, as shown by the Oil 
Platforms case, and Simma, Khan, Nolte and Paulus speak appreciatively of 
it.39 President Obama’s reliance on the theory can be spotted by his 
announcement:  
 
‘While we have not yet detected specific 
plotting against our homeland, ISIL leaders 
have threatened America and our allies’. 40 
 
Nonetheless, the UNSC has not officially adopted or acknowledged it. Tams 
is one author who expresses concern over this doctrine when he means that 
its adoption could act as ‘an open-ended licence to use force’41. However, it 
is not as though attacks by non-state actors like ISIS would rise owing to 
this method of accountability. Careful delimitations and reasonableness in 
the application would anyways need to be taken account of, just as in the 
case of any other legal provision. Hence I do not see the immediate harm in 
the implementation of this theory.    
                                                
39 Simma et al, The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary (3rd edn, vol II, OUP 
2012) 1409  
40 Obama (n 1) 
41 Tams (n 34) 389 
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4.2 Anticipatory use of force  
The IBA separate anticipatory use of force from pre-emptive use of force.42 
Anticipatory use of force has not gained acceptance in international law.43 
However the indications of the Caroline case are representative of the view 
that anticipatory self-defence can be used, under the prerequisite that certain 
conditions are met. These are namely that the relevant threat is ‘instant, 
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of 
deliberation’44. I find that this approach can be somewhat troublesome, even 
when justifying anticipatory use of force against ISIS, as I will try to reflect 
below. 
 
Simma, Khan, Nolte and Paulus believe that the Caroline formula is out-
dated and should not be affiliated with UNC article 51.45 The intention is to 
curb the misuse of force by states against other states and non-state actors. 
As the reader may notice, the difficulty of this is similar to the one that the 
accumulation of events doctrine faces. Though I expressed some degree of 
leniency towards the accumulation of events doctrine and discussed the 
feasibility of its successful application, my assessment is slightly different in 
the case of anticipatory use of force. It can be much harder to predict and 
prove an imminent and singled out future-armed attack than an armed attack 
which follows a series of patterns over an identified period of time.  
 
Hence it seems that the dangers stemming from the anticipatory use of force 
are somewhat high, at least higher than those risks emanating from the 
theory of accumulation. As a consequence there can be rational reasons for 
not accepting anticipatory use of force against ISIS, at least not until the 
factual circumstances and state practice show otherwise. The UN High-level 
                                                
42 Noelle (n 26) 577 
43 Byers (n 17) 411 
44 UN Doc. S/PV.2283:56 (1981) 
45 Simma et al (n 39) 1423  
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Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change tried to clear the air by 
campaigning that it is specifically imminence that could justify an 
anticipatory use of force.46 The critic and not least the UNSC may find it 
difficult to separate this from the criteria set out in the Caroline formula and 
not surprisingly so.47   
 
Of course one cannot deny that there can arise situations were 
characteristics of both the theories are prevalent. There is reason to see the 
fate of these scenarios as a case of accumulation of events, but clearly if the 
anticipated attack is too far out in time from the series of already occurred 
armed attacks, then there is reason to be cautious.    
 
4.3 Necessity and proportionality 
4.3.1 Necessity as a filter 
It is established that necessity and proportionality is a feature of self-defence 
in customary international law and the U.S. and its allies have certainly not 
understated these criteria for the purposes of justifying their use of force in 
Iraq and Syria. It would be in order to start with necessity as the first 
threshold that self-defence has to cross followed by the discussion of 
proportionality. The validity of this set-up seems appropriate firstly because 
the substantive absence of necessity would make void any claims of 
proportionality and so this serves as an adequate filter. Secondly, it might 
even be concluded that proportionality is indeed a case specific topic and a 
matter, which usually calls for consideration of relatively many more 
circumstances than necessity, and as a result of this it should be studied 
subsequent to necessity.  
 
 
                                                
46 UNGA, ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’ (2004) para 188 
47 Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks (1st 
edn, CUP 2002) 67 
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4.3.2 Elements of necessity 
Corton declares three characteristics of necessity; immediacy, effectiveness 
(adequacy or appropriateness) and proportionality48. It is interesting to 
note, that besides being consumed in the necessity assessment, the last 
named criterion is even an independent feature of self-defence. It therefore 
becomes important to keep the two terms apart. Apart from this, Corton 
even sheds light on that if other more ‘appropriate’ methods are deliberately 
not used, then the means being used cannot be necessary.49 A state’s 
inability to deal with non-state actors operating on its territory, which was 
even considered under the rubric of attribution, is thought to equate with 
increased necessity.50 The same applies when a host-state, despite the 
availability of resources, is consciously not trying to suppress the 
destructive activities of non-state actors towards another state.51      
        
4.3.3 Necessity and ISIS 
When applied to ISIS, the above-presented markers could be used to suggest 
that the necessity of containing the threat of ISIS justifies intervention in 
Iraq and Syria. After all, the leaderships of Iraq and Syria have been unable 
to deal with ISIS and Iraq has explicitly consented to external intervention. 
It is difficult to legally assess the fulfilment of the other criteria mentioned 
in the previous section in relation to ISIS.  
 
Furthermore, ISIS has time and again expressed the will to take over the 
world, more increasingly after the pronouncement of the ‘caliphate’ in June 
2014. Some observers do not see this as a possible outcome, whereas others 
believe that the declaration poses a threat to the sovereignty, ‘conceptions of 
                                                
48 Steenberghe (n 24) 783 
49 ibid 
50 ibid 766f and Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self Defence (5th edn, CUP 2001) 
217  
51 David Kretzmer, ‘The inherent right to self-defence and proportionality’ (2013) 24 EJIL 
273 
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territoriality and tactics of territoriality’52, and ultimately the security of 
other states. Then there is of course a third category that identifies 
indiscriminate terrorist attacks by returnees and converts to ISIS to the West 
as the worst and most likely scenario.53 Both the latter categories would 
agree that necessity to intervene in Iraq and Syria exists. 
 
4.3.4 Proportionality 
The ‘means-end’ test and ‘tit for tat’ test are the two formulae that are 
adhered to when dealing with proportionality.54 As the names suggest, the 
first test is designed so that a victim state can use means that are just 
necessary to attain ‘legitimate’55 aims of the intervention, which is usually 
to ‘halt and repel the attack’56. The second test would enable a victim state 
to respond to a degree that concorded with the attack. In the Use of Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion (1996) it was suggested that for use of force to 
be proportionate, it must conform to the rules of armed conflict and 
humanitarian law.57 
 
There seem to be ‘grave and minor infractions of prohibition against 
force’.58 As was revealed in the Nicaragua and Oil Platforms case either of 
the two transgressions suffices as grounds of self-defence if the attack itself 
availed ‘grave forms of force’.59 Further, the Chantham House Principles 
renounce any level of gravity at all for an armed attack to be able to 
generate a response.60 In the Oil Platforms case, Judge Simma went as far as 
suggesting that a small reprisal would be an acceptable measure to redress a 
small attack (my italics).61 This along with Simma’s disregard of ‘deterrent, 
                                                
52 Yosef Jabareen, ‘The Emerging Islamic State: Terror, Territoriality, and the Agenda of 
the Social Transformation’ (2014) 58 Geoforum 51 
53 Weinberg (n 38) 336 
54 Kretzmer (n 51) 235 
55 ibid 239 and UNC preamble para 7 
56 Kretzmer (n 51) 250 
57 Linderfalk (n 18) 865, 871 
58 Tams (n 34) 375 and Steenberghe (n 24) 759 
59 Dino Kritsiotis, ‘Close Encounters of a Sovereign Kind’ (2009) 20 EJIL 308 
60 Kretzmer (n 51) 243 
61 Oil Platforms (Separate Opinion Judge Simma) (2003) para 13 
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retributive, or even punitive motives’62 behind acts of self-defence in a 
commentary of the UNC has the potential of raising some eyebrows. This is 
due to that reprisals are in fact not allowed under international law, as 
witnessed by the FRD, ARSIWA and S/RES/188 (1964).  
 
4.3.5 Proportionality and ISIS 
 
In September 2014 President Obama revealed that the aim of intervention in 
Iraq and Syria was to ‘degrade and ultimately destroy’63 ISIS, which could 
seem in order as a ‘legitimate’ cause as ISIS is the source of the armed 
attack. It has of course even been suggested that U.S.’, NATO’s and their 
partners’ goal in Iraq and Syria is to push for democracy64, which makes 
uncertain the legitimacy of intervention, and there are certainly those that 
express that this is just not desired nor well-suited for Islamic states. In the 
latter’s eyes the intervention is not proportional. Lastly, this section must be 
read parallel with the previous section as legitimacy and necessity are 
intertwined.      
 
 
 
                                                
62 Simma et al (n 39)1427 
63 Obama (n 1) 
64 Weinberg (n 38) 337 
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5 Use of force against ISIS after 
consent of the Iraqi and 
Syrian governments?  
Integrity and independence are so imperative rights that it is not surprising 
that Benjamin Franklin once expressed himself so bleakly:  
 
 ‘They who would give up an essential 
liberty for temporary security, deserve 
neither liberty nor security.’65 
 
However, this is far from the prevailing view in the international 
community. It is a well-integrated part of customary international law that 
invitation or ‘genuine’ consent excuses the breach of UNC article 2.4.66  
 
5.1 Accepting consent in specific 
circumstances   
Both Corton and Raphael dislike the notion of using consent as a ball plank 
if all other methods for justifying the use of force fail. Firstly, the exception 
they say is when consent is given much in advance for example in a treaty. 
The situation in Iraq and Syria is of an interim nature and at least in this 
case no treaties have been signed. Secondly, in their view, a valid consent 
exists when; 
 
§ Consent comes from recognised governments with 
control.  
§ Consent is unimpaired, explicit and complete. 
                                                
65 Eric Metcalfe, ‘Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law: Security 
versus Liberty?’ (2005) 1 EHRLR 112 
66 Byers (n 17) 403 and Simma et al (n 20) 214 
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§ Consent is not the result of any form of legally 
termed duress. 67 
 
5.2 Consent and ISIS 
The government of Iraq, in contrast to the government of Syria, has given 
consent to the international community to enter and combat ISIS. In spite of 
the fact that Syria has not explicitly welcomed external aid, some believe its 
passivity to be a clear sign of consent.   
 
One problem arises when we consider the liabilities of the governments in 
Iraq and Syria and start to contemplate whether consent by failing 
governments suffices.68 
 
                                                
67 Steenberghe (n 24) 772 
68 Simma et al (n 20) 215 
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6 Use of force for the purposes 
of humanitarian intervention 
Humanitarian intervention and the right to it is by far one of the areas that 
displays the most dissenting set of opinions. Some claim that no such right 
exists while others hint at that, though it does not exist on paper, it is a part 
of international customary law. The interests of nationals of other states is 
often claimed to be the justificatory element. Simma, Khan, Nolte, Paulus 
and Kimberley are convinced that this is not the case, not even for the 
alleged responsibility to protect.69  
 
The U.S. has been pursuing its aims in Iraq and Syria in the name of 
humanitarian intervention since August of last year.70 It claims that it was 
the plight of the Yazidis that took them there. Weinberg’s claim that it was 
the torture and murders of the U.S. nationals and servicemen and women in 
for example Erbil, which brought about the U.S. intervention in Iraq and 
Syria would be agreeable even to Simma, Khan, Nolte and Paulus as they 
recognise the reasonableness of intervention for the sake of own nationals in 
another country as lawful. 71 
 
 
 
 
                                                
69 Simma et al (n 20) 224f and Trapp (n 23) 147 
70 Michael Schelerer et al., ‘Whose fight is this?’ (2014) 184 Time 16  
71 Weinberg (n 38) 336  
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7 Conclusions and analysis 
7.1 Why is even the (lawful) use of force 
not well received?  
The following section falls outside the immediate scope of the research 
question, but the multifaceted considerations related to ISIS and the use of 
force are incomplete without this account.  
 
The intervention in Iraq and Syria has had its ups and downs. The attacks of 
2007 led by General David Petreus were hailed not only by the international 
community, but the populations of Iraq and Syria. Legal intervention in Iraq 
and Syria has not always proved to be a success. Perhaps it is on account of 
this widely accepted fact that proclaimed intentions of combatting ISIS are 
met with cynicism.  
 
Cyndi provides a valuable insight into the matter. Her research fingers at the 
unclear course of action of the Coalition Provisional Authority and 
Departments as well as clashes between the new Councils and old Ministries 
responsible for the deficiencies of the Iraqi Justice Integration Project. She 
even holds military interferences in the judicial system accountable for the 
downfall. In summary, she condemns the ‘top-down’, ‘minimal’ and 
‘substantive’ nature of the rule of law that was faultily trying to be 
implemented in Iraq.72 So even if there is lawful intervention, the 
international community is up against an incline when securing the buy-in 
of the Iraqi and Syrian people. 
 
Even the immediate spill over effects of countering ISIS and arming local 
forces, such as the unintentional strengthening of the Syrian President 
Bashar al-Assad’s regime is not well received, as the Syrian Sunni 
                                                
72 Cyndi Banks, ‘Reconstructing justice in Iraq: promoting the rule of law in a post-conflict 
state’ (2010) 2 HJRL 155, 160, 165, 166, 169  
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population, has for quite some time claimed to be victim of suppression by 
the government. The Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has not been 
object of such level of criticism.   
  
7.2 Where to now? 
The purpose of this essay was to bring to light the actions toward ISIS and 
their legitimacy. As the reader may rightfully be suspecting, there is no clear 
answer to the question.  
 
Waiting for the breakthrough of the current plan of action is one aspect, but 
Cronin circumvents this approach. He strongly recommends  
 
‘offensive containment: combining a 
limited military campaign and economic 
effort’.73 
 
In essence he points to the need for collective acts of coercion toward ISIS, 
including but not limited to the use of armed force. Coll is also for the 
placement of an armed force on Iraqi and Syrian soil.74 In contrast, 
Weinberg and Hassan reject military measures altogether.75  
 
Irrespective of our answers regarding legitimacy, perhaps the solution to 
tackle the on-going crisis may be found in the idiom that to achieve desired 
aims one must sometimes press where it hurts the most. If we take 
McCants’ conclusion to be true, namely that ISIS’ territorial control is its 
most valuable resource76 then it is precisely this that ought to be the subject 
of attack. Perhaps the answer even lies in friendly politics with the reigning 
governments and economic and social considerations for Iraq and Syria.  
                                                
73 Cronin (n 8) 
74 Coll (n 13) 27 
75 Weinberg (n 38) 335 and Mehdi Hassan, ‘The first “war on terror” was a failure. Do we 
really need a sequel?’ (2014) 143 New Statesman 35  
76 William McCants, ’State of Confusion’ (2014) 93 Foreign Affairs  
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